The Dressmaker\u27s Dilemma:  Sexual Abuse, Corporate Accountability, and the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Migrant Women in Jordan\u27s Qualified Industrial Zones by Skaden, Nura
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 38 | Issue 3 Article 10
2013
The Dressmaker's Dilemma: Sexual Abuse,
Corporate Accountability, and the Convention for
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Migrant Women in Jordan's Qualified
Industrial Zones
Nura Skaden
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Nura Skaden, The Dressmaker's Dilemma: Sexual Abuse, Corporate Accountability, and the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Migrant Women in Jordan's Qualified Industrial Zones, 38 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2013).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol38/iss3/10
  
THE DRESSMAKER’S DILEMMA: 
SEXUAL ABUSE, CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE 
CONVENTION FOR THE ELIMINATION 
OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST MIGRANT WOMEN IN 
JORDAN’S QUALIFIED INDUSTRIAL 
ZONES 
INTRODUCTION 
n June 17, 2011, a twenty-six year-old Bangladeshi 
woman, encouraged by the Institute for Global Labor and 
Human Rights (“IGLHR”), a U.S.-based advocacy group, filed a 
formal complaint with Jordanian authorities that she had been 
raped by Classic Fashion Apparel (“Classic”) factory’s top man-
ager, Anil Santha.1 Mr. Santha was arrested that month under 
suspicion of raping the young woman three times since her ar-
rival at the factory in March of 2011.2 Following the Bangla-
deshi woman’s complaint, several other female workers came 
forward charging similar acts of sexual harassment and abuse 
by Santha in 2010 and 2011 including one woman who had be-
come pregnant from the assault.3 The controversy fueled wor-
ries about the future of the apparel manufacturing industry in 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. Miguel Bustillo, Sex Abuse Alleged at Apparel Maker, WALL ST. J., 
June 20, 2011, at B3. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Jamal Halaby, Jordan Rights Group: No Proof of Rape at Factory, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9837153 [hereinafter No Proof of 
Rape]. See INST. FOR GLOBAL LABOUR & HUMAN RIGHTS, SEXUAL PREDATORS 
AND SERIAL RAPISTS RUN WILD AT WAL-MART SUPPLIER IN JORDAN 6–10 (2011) 
[hereinafter SEXUAL PREDATORS], available at 
http://www.globallabourrights.org/admin/reports/files/Content-Classic-0607-
final.pdf. The eighty-two page report, issued by the Institute for Global La-
bour and Human Rights (“IGLHR”), compiled a series of interviews with fe-
male guest workers at Classic Fashion in Al Hassan Industrial Estate. In the 
interviews, the women described the systematic rape and torture of female 
employees by workplace supervisors at the factory. Id. at 6–22. 
O
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Jordan, since textile exports to the United States are a main 
source of national revenue.4 
Classic, which produces clothing for major U.S. retailers—
including Wal-Mart, Target, Macy’s, Kohl’s and Lands’ End—is 
Jordan’s largest garment exporter. 5 With Classic having annu-
al exports estimated at US$125 million, nearly 13% of Jordan’s 
one billion dollar garment exports industry,6 Jordan has a large 
stake in the success and continued performance of Classic’s 
business relationship with U.S.-based corporations. Thus, it did 
not come as a surprise when Jordanian investigators seemed 
reluctant to look into the veracity of the Classic rape allega-
tions, perhaps out of fear for the economic repercussions of val-
idating the claims.7 Notably, Mr. Santha was not prosecuted; 
rather, he fled to Sri Lanka, his native country, allegedly with 
the assistance of the Jordanian Ministry of Labor.8 
                                                                                                                                     
 4. Janell Ross, Major American Brands Silent on Alleged Rights Abuses 
at Overseas Factories, HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/21/american-brands-abuses-factories-
jordan-labor-conditions_n_903995.html. 
 5. Jamal Halaby, Rape Case Involving Foreign Workers Turns Focus to 
Jordan’s Factory Problems, ARAB NEWS (Sept. 7, 2011), 
http://www.arabnews.com/node/390209 [hereinafter Rape Case Turns Focus]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. The Labor Ministry’s director of inspection and safety, Adnan Raba-
baa, told the Jordan Times shortly after the IGLHR report was issued that, 
“[w]e formed an ad hoc committee comprising members of all concerned enti-
ties who have already started arbitrary interviews with the labourers in this 
particular company in order to verify the accusations in the report;” however, 
the committee’s findings have not yet been publicized. Jordan Probing Abuse 
Claims, DAILY MIRROR (June 13, 2011), 
http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/11907-jordan-probing-abuse-claims.html. 
Investigation of the situation by the National Center for Human Rights 
(“NCHR”), a non-governmental rights group found “no information to support 
the rape allegations,” alleging that there were contradictions in the victims’ 
testimonies. See No Proof of Rape, supra note 3. However, the NCHR did not 
provide examples of the alleged contradictions or explain investigators’ suspi-
cions of the women’s statements. Id. When a reporter from the Associated 
Press visited Classic’s factory, supervisors from Classic, as well as Classic’s 
owner and managing director Sanal Kumar, presented six women for inter-
view with the reporter. See Rape Case Turns Focus, supra note 5. All six 
women were roommates of the women who reported rape, and speaking un-
der the constant watch of the factory supervisors, disclaimed any knowledge 
of rape in the factory. Id. 
 8. Major Progress in Jordan! Accused Rapist Flees, Public Pressure Forces 
Investigation, CHANGE.ORG (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://www.globallabourrights.org/press?id=0375. 
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The case of Classic points to the difficulties of assessing lia-
bility for human rights abuses against women working as over-
seas contract workers (“OCW”) or guest workers within a mul-
tinational corporation (“MNC”) framework. While Jordan is in-
vested in promoting corporate contracts within its borders, it 
does not have a system of oversight to regulate the practices of 
those MNCs that are complicit in labor and human rights vio-
lations.9 That both Mr. Santha and the woman who initially 
came forward to report the rape have left Jordan, further illus-
trates the difficulties of preventing and managing abuses 
among OCWs—a vulnerable population that is viewed as easily 
replaceable.10 Though the victims and perpetrators of sexual 
abuse in the workplace may disappear, the problems Jordan 
faces with regards to violations of female workers rights re-
main a salient issue. 
Non-American foreigners own most of the factories in Jor-
dan’s industrial zone and operate as subcontractors for 
MNCs.11 This legal separation between factories and MNCs al-
lows companies, such as Macy’s, Kohl’s, and Lands’ End, to ar-
gue they have no control or responsibility over the abuses that 
occur within factories they do not own. Following the exposé of 
sexual abuse at Classic, the companies withdrew their business 
from the factory and wiped their hands clean of the situation.12 
However, the seamstresses for whom abysmal work conditions, 
sexual harassment, and physical abuse are a daily reality are 
not aided by MNCs ceasing to do business with the factories 
                                                                                                                                     
 9. NAT’L LABOR COMM., U.S.-JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT DESCENDS 
INTO HUMAN TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE 1 (2006) [hereinafter 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE], available at 
http://www.globallabourrights.org/admin/documents/files/Jordan_Report_05_
03.pdf. 
 10. LIN LEAN LIM ET AL., INT’L LABOUR ORG., PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION, 
EXPLOITATION, AND ABUSE OF WOMEN MIGRANT WORKERS: AN INFORMATION 
GUIDE, BOOKLET 1—INTRODUCTION: WHY THE FOCUS ON WOMEN 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT WORKERS 9–28 (2003). 
 11. IBRAHIM SAIF, THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE QUALIFIED 
INDUSTRIAL ZONES IN JORDAN 44 (2006); see also Ran Dagoni, China main ben-
eficiary of US-Israel-Jordan QIZ, GLOBES (May 4, 2006), 
www.globes.co.ilserveen/g;obes/docview.asp?did=1000088134. 
 12. Rape Case Turns Focus, supra note 5. “Days after news of the rape 
allegations emerged, U.S. retailers Kohl’s, Macy’s and Lands’ End stopped 
placing orders from Classic . . . . [W]ithin four weeks, Classic’s losses reached 
US$10 million, or 8 percent of its annual exports.” Id. 
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they rely on for employment.13 MNCs who employ sweatshop 
type labor,14 such as Wal-Mart and Target, should not escape 
liability for their complicity in the inhumane treatment admin-
istered therein;15 the manufacturing plants would not be in 
business were it not for MNC demand of their products. MNC 
dependence on cheap labor to maintain high profits has engen-
dered a business model that favors absolute output, without 
regard for the quality of workers’ environment and supervi-
sion.16 
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (“CEDAW” or “Convention”)17 along with its Optional 
Protocol,18 gives countries the tools to improve the condition of 
                                                                                                                                     
 13. See Debra Cohen Maryanov, Sweatshop Liability: Corporate Codes of 
Conduct and the Governance of Labor Standards in the International Supply 
Chain, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 397, 412 (2010) (“Terminating the contract 
sends a clear message [to suppliers] . . . but also risks hurting the workers 
who may lose their jobs. Some labor organizations therefore recommend ter-
mination only when suppliers refuse to cooperate, and even then urge com-
panies to seek alternative local suppliers to keep production in the country.”). 
 14. See BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR, http://www.business-
humanrights.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). The Business and Human 
Rights Resource Center has tracked the human rights performance of over 
5,000 corporations in over 180 countries. The Center has documented abuses 
ranging from health and safety violations in the workplace, to discrimination, 
and social and environmental degradation. A Brief Description, BUS. & 
HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR., http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Aboutus/Briefdescription (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). 
 15. HUMAN TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, supra note 9, at 61–67 
(Walmart), 20–24 (Target). 
 16. Maryanov, supra note 13, at 424 (“MNCs profit from sweatshop condi-
tions and cause investment injuries by using profits to perpetuate the ar-
rangement with . . . monitoring systems that discourage involvement by 
stakeholders to improve labor conditions.”). See also Does I v. Gap, Inc., No. 
CV-01-0031, 2002 WL 1000068, at *3 (D.N. Mar. I. May 10, 2002) (concluding 
that “the plaintiffs have properly alleged an association-in-fact enterprise 
consisting of individual retailers and individual manufacturers” by alleging 
that the retailers used their collective “power through contracts, oversight, 
and economic pressure,” to require garment manufacturers to continue un-
lawful policies and practices that perpetuated sweatshop conditions in textile 
plants). 
 17. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women [CEDAW], G.A. Res. 34/180, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 
18, 1979). 
 18. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 
(Oct. 15, 1999) [hereinafter CEDAW Optional Protocol]. For the history and 
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women in society. Jordan ratified almost all the provisions of 
the CEDAW in 1992; however, it did not adopt the Optional 
Protocol.19 The Optional Protocol would have given victims an 
additional complaint mechanism before the CEDAW Commit-
tee for claims alleging a violation of any of the rights set forth 
in the Convention.20 So, women suffering from workplace abuse 
are constrained to seeking help from factory personnel, non-
profit organizations, or Jordanian law enforcement and offi-
cials. It is therefore imperative that Jordan create a system of 
law and order that will address the root causes of violence 
against women in the workplace. 
Jordan’s current administration of the Convention,21 through 
the criminal prosecution of individual sex crimes, fails to pro-
                                                                                                                                     
detailed analysis of the Optional Protocol, see Felip Gomez Isa, The Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women: Strengthening the Protection Mechanisms of Women’s Hu-
man Rights, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 291, 305–20 (2003). 
 19. Status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) [hereinafter CEDAW Sta-
tus]. Jordan ratified the CEDAW on July 1, 1992. Id. Pursuant to Jordanian 
law, the ratification of an international convention renders it a self-executing 
treaty, automatically incorporated into national law. Kathryn Christine Ar-
nold, Are the Perpetrators of Honor Killings Getting Away with Murder? Arti-
cle 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code Analyzed under the Convention of the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 16 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 1343, 1349 (2001). Jordan does not consider itself bound by Articles 
9(2), 16(1)(d), and 16(1)(g). CEDAW Sessions: Declarations, Reservations and 
Objections to CEDAW, U.N. DIV. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2013); CEDAW Success Stories, UNIFEM, 
http://www.unifem.org/cedaw30/success_stories/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). 
 20. CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 18, art. 2. The Protocol also con-
tains a process that empowers the Committee to initiate inquiries into “grave 
or systemic violations by a State of rights set forth in the Convention,” after 
receiving reliable information of such violations. Id. art. 8. 
 21. Jordan has not adopted the Optional Protocol. CEDAW Status, supra 
note 19. The Optional Protocol provides a mechanism for the CEDAW Com-
mittee to hold State Parties accountable for human rights abuses which 
moves beyond the reporting process and general comments. See CEDAW Op-
tional Protocol, supra note 18. It contains a communications mechanism that 
allows individuals or groups of individuals under the jurisdiction of a State 
party to bring complaints to the CEDAW Committee alleging a violation of 
any of the rights set forth in the Convention. Id. art 2. The Protocol also con-
tains a process through which the Committee is empowered to initiate an 
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tect female workers in sexually violent work environments in 
the MNC supplier context. 22  The Jordanian government at-
tempted to discharge its duties under the CEDAW by prosecut-
ing Classic’s supervisor for rape,23 a charge that carried a fif-
teen-year maximum prison sentence.24  However, the impris-
onment of one man fails to protect other women from the abu-
sive factory conditions permitted by the MNCs employing fac-
tories like Classic.25 
The CEDAW’s distinctive obligations call for systemic rather 
than individualistic sanctions. Therefore, to address this sys-
temic problem, international response to the sexual abuse of 
female workers should include holding the “big fish”—the 
MNCs—accountable for the labor conditions that are conducive 
to these violations. Jordan is in a unique position to enforce 
human rights among companies it grants the privilege of doing 
business within its borders; it should not be considered to have 
met its obligations under the CEDAW until it addresses MNCs’ 
role in human rights violations against female workers. With-
                                                                                                                                     
inquiry into “grave or systemic violations by a State of rights set forth in the 
Convention,” after receiving reliable information of such violations. Id. art. 8. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See No Proof of Rape, supra note 3. 
 24. Rape Case Turns Focus, supra note 5. 
 25. Allegations of rape and sexual assault against female workers by Clas-
sic supervisors were brought to Wal-Mart and Target’s attention at least as 
early as 2008 when female workers went on strike to resist workplace abuses. 
Three Thousand Workers Strike in Jordan Sewing for Wal-Mart and Other 
Companies, INST. FOR GLOBAL LABOUR & HUMAN RIGHTS (Dec. 14, 2007), 
http://www.globallabourrights.org/alerts?id=0190. However, after alleging 
that their investigations showed no proof of these human rights violations, 
both corporations continued to not only use Classic’s products without any 
additional enforcement mechanisms of Classic’s code of conduct, but also con-
tinued to employ the supervisors repeatedly accused of heinous activity as 
subcontractors. See Responses by Textile Manufacturers and Clothing Retail-
ers to Concerns about Working Conditions in Factories in Jordan, BUS. & 
HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR, http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Documents/Jordanfactories (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) (fea-
turing letters from Wal-Mart and Target Corp. dated Oct. 17, 2006, and Oct. 
17, 2006, respectively); see also Ross, supra note 4. Similar reports of sexual 
abuse are seen as early as 2006, when the IGLHR reported that four young 
women were sexually abused by factory managers at Western Factory, a tex-
tile supplier plant for Wal-Mart, Kohl’s and GAP located in Jordan’s Quali-
fied Industrial Zone (“QIZ”). HUMAN TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, 
supra note 9, at 11. 
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out government oversight and civil sanctions, corporations are 
unlikely to prioritize human rights over profits. 
Numerous instances of human rights abuses in Jordan 26 
demonstrate the need for additional protections of OCWs and a 
means of redress for sexual assault through a monetary puni-
tive system.27 While the imprisonment of a lower-level worker 
will have no impact on how MNCs organize their labor and en-
force workplace health and safety provisions, if Jordan were to 
impose civil liability on corporations through pecuniary sanc-
tions and compensation to the victim, MNCs would be more 
likely to self-monitor for violations and enforce a stricter code 
of conduct to deter violations.28 Indeed, “[a]s a rational cost-
benefit calculator, the company is [much more] likely to be re-
sponsive to a financial penalty.”29 The failure of the Jordanian 
government to effectively enforce women’s rights against these 
larger corporate entities to date has left female garment work-
ers in factory settings vulnerable to repeated human rights 
abuses.30 
This Note will focus on one particular case illustrating the 
plight of female overseas contract factory workers in Jordan to 
reveal the ineffectiveness of the CEDAW enforcement in MNC 
factory environments, and to identify the problems inherent to 
Jordan’s relationship with MNCs and its lack of oversight 
thereof. This Note will then argue that to realize the goals of 
the CEDAW, Jordan should focus on deterrence of sex crimes 
against women in the workplace through a top-down enforce-
ment mechanism, by placing liability for workplace abuses not 
only on individual offenders, but also on the MNCs benefiting 
from such practices. 
Part I describes Jordan’s OCW labor system with regards to 
women in the textile industry. Part II identifies the Articles of 
the CEDAW relevant to female factory workers and the rights 
Jordan must protect under the CEDAW. Part III discusses why 
Jordan’s current treatment of workplace abuses in the MNC 
                                                                                                                                     
 26. See SEXUAL PREDATORS, supra note 3, at 4; see also HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
& INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, supra note 9. 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. See James Gobert, Controlling Corporate Criminality: Penal Sanctions 
and Beyond, 2 WEB JCLI (1998), 
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1998/issue2/gobert2.html. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
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supplier factory setting does not offer proper relief for victims 
or the female workforce in general and thus does not discharge 
Jordan’s duties under the CEDAW. Part IV suggests overall 
changes Jordan should make to better protect female work-
ers—in the form of sexual harassment laws—and proposes to 
hold MNCs accountable for violations of such laws in order to 
end workplace abuse from the top down. 
 
I. THE OCW SYSTEM AND FEMALE MNC TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
WORKERS 
Jordan’s worker demographics consists of approximately 
17.38% migrant OCWs (also known as guest workers), non-
Jordanian nationals engaging in labor activities. 31  Migrants 
move from one state to another, in large part due to the struc-
tural economic inequalities among states with respect to ac-
cess, opportunity, and compensation.32 While Jordan provided 
much of the migrant labor to the region’s other Arab countries 
during the oil price increases of 1973 and 1974, recent econom-
ic agreements have reversed this trend and attracted OCWs to 
work within Jordan’s borders.33 
The influx of OCWs into Jordan has been heightened by the 
manual labor and production needs of Western-based compa-
nies that established manufacturing plants in the country. In 
1997, the Qualified Industrial Zone Agreement (“Agreement”) 
was signed between Jordan and the United States, creating 
privileges for those factories that comply with the Agreement’s 
                                                                                                                                     
 31. See Jordan Background Note, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/jordan/180176.htm (last updated Mar. 25, 
2011). Of Jordan’s estimated 1.8 million person workforce, 313,000 are regis-
tered guest workers. Id. International Convention of the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 
45/158, art. (2)(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990) (definition of mi-
grant laborer). 
 32. See Joan Fitzpatrick & Katrina R. Kelly, Gendered Aspects of Migra-
tion: Law and the Female Migrant, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 64–
65 (1998) (describing the disparities and noting that Singapore, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, and oil-rich Gulf states constitute states receiving women for 
migrant labor). 
 33. DAVID ZISKIND, LABOR LAWS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: TRADITION IN TRANSIT 
56 (1990); see also Labor Force, in JORDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY (Helen Chapin 
Metz ed. 1989), available at http://countrystudies.us/jordan/48.htm. 
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requirements.34 Since 1998, Jordan has enjoyed duty- and quo-
ta-free access to the U.S. market, pursuant to the Agreement, 
for products made in the Qualified Industrial Zone (“QIZ”), 
production areas designated by Jordanian authorities and ap-
proved by the United States government.35  QIZ factories in 
Jordan are also exempt from almost all local Jordanian taxes 
including: “all income tax on corporate profits; all income and 
social services taxes on the salaries and allowances paid to non-
Jordanian workers; all import and export duties on raw mate-
rials, parts, and finished goods for export; and all licensing fees 
as well as local building and land taxes.”36 QIZ factories, owned 
mainly by foreigners,37 can also repatriate 100% of their profits 
to their country of origin.38 Since signing the QIZ Agreement, 
Jordan has since become a magnet for apparel manufacturing. 
In 2001, Jordan made steps to further attract industries to 
use its labor when it entered into a free trade agreement with 
the United States (“USFTA”), allowing American companies to 
import goods from Jordan tariff-free. 39 In addition, the USFTA 
                                                                                                                                     
 34. The Agreement Establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) Between Jordan 
and the United States of America, MINISTRY OF INDUS. & TRADE, THE 
HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, [hereinafter Jordanian Ministry on 
USFTA], available at http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=703 (last vis-
ited Apr. 26, 2013). 
 35. Id. 
[T]he objective of these zones is to promote peace and stability 
through economic integration in the region, Jordanian, Egyptian and 
Israeli goods originating in the QIZ’s were granted un-reciprocal du-
ty free access to US markets. Such an arrangement was beneficial to 
both Jordan and Israel: Israel was able to utilize Jordan’s low wage 
advantages, and Jordan was able to utilize Israel’s existing market 
channel link in the USA, as well as its sophisticated technology and 
management. As a result, QIZs have been able to operate at a higher 
level of productivity than the rest of the industries in the region. QIZ 
exports have now risen to top all other Jordanian exports, making 
the USA Jordan’s main export destination. 
SAIF, supra note 11, at 5. 
 36. See HUMAN TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, supra note 9, at 
19. 
 37. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. 
 38. See Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area [USFTA], 
U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63. 
 39. See id. The USFTA is supposedly the “gold standard” for incorporating 
international labor rights as set out by the International Labor Organization 
(“ILO”), into domestic law. However, the agreement has proved difficult to 
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allowed for the elimination of customs duties for garments pro-
duced in QIZs.40 In 1998, before the USFTA and QIZ were 
signed, Jordan’s exports to the United States barely reached 
US$17 million, but by 2006 those exports surpassed the US$1 
billion mark.41 Garments currently account for almost 90% of 
Jordanian exports to the United States.42 
There are currently nine QIZs in Jordan and 114 investment 
companies located in these zones.43 Out of these investment 
companies, fifty-nine export their products to the United 
States44 and hold Qualified Product Request (“QPR”) certifi-
cates issued by the Ministry of Industry and Trade.45 Fifty-five 
                                                                                                                                     
enforce with regards to labor violations. Marley S. Weiss, Two Steps Forward, 
One Step Back—or Vice Versa: Labor Rights Under Free Trade Agreements 
from NAFTA, Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America, and Beyond, 37 
U.S.F. L. REV. 689, 700 (2003). (“[The USFTA] epitomize[s] the superficial 
solution of adding externally-set international labor standards to the supra-
national enforceability of domestic ones, and incorporating labor provisions in 
the main body of the agreement . . . .while nominally available, sanctions will 
virtually never be applied.”). See USFTA, art. 6(1), 6(3), 41 I.L.M. at 70 
(“Each Party shall strive to ensure that its laws provide for labor standards 
consistent with the [specified] internationally recognized labor rights and 
shall strive to improve those standards in that light.”). Enforcing labor 
standards, and particularly the question of who should be enforcing them and 
who should be liable for violations, has been the subject of enormous litiga-
tion. The Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) is a powerful instrument of remedy 
against U.S.-based MNC violations of international human rights. See gener-
ally Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor Standards: The 
Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 203, 205 
(2004). This federal statute may be used as a way of giving force to interna-
tional agreements pertaining to labor standards by holding companies re-
sponsible for their treatment of foreign workers. See id. at 205; see also Mar-
yanov, supra note 13, at 417–22. However, the ATCA is not a substitute for 
domestic law, and Jordan must institute its own policies to protect women’s 
rights in the workplace as is required under the CEDAW. 
 40. Jordanian Ministry on USFTA, supra note 34. 
 41. MINISTRY OF LABOUR, REPORT ON STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE 
QUALIFIED INDUSTRIAL ZONES 5 (2006) (Jordan), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/tvpra/20091027c.pdf [hereinafter 
MINISTRY OF LABOUR REPORT]. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. AMIR PROGRAM, JORDAN’S MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT: QIZ UNIT 2–4 (2004), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACY034.pdf (describing the Qualifying Prod-
uct Request (“QPR”) certification process). Companies receive a QPR certifi-
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of these companies operate as subcontractors for U.S.-based 
labels, with migrant workers accounting for 76% of the labor 
force in these subcontracting companies.46 In 2006, documented 
migrant workers totaled 36,149 out of the 54,077 workers in 
the 114 QIZ textile company factories.47 The majority of these 
guest workers were women.48 
Most clothing is made by guest workers from Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka and China, who typically work under low-wage con-
tracts.49 After conducting a survey of Jordanian women work-
ing in the QIZ in 2000, the Jordanian Ministry of Labor stated 
that, “the working conditions in the Qualifying Industrial 
Zones (QIZ) are of sub-standard levels as far as Jordanians are 
concerned.”50 In 2011, the IGLHR reported continued abuses 
committed by QIZ factory managers against Asian guest work-
ers, including late payment of wages, withholding of passports, 
unsanitary lodging conditions, and police breaking up im-
promptu strikes.51 
                                                                                                                                     
cate after meeting content and place of origin requirements. Their products 
must “add[] value of not less than 35 percent of the total appraised value of 
the product [in Jordan].” Id. In addition, the “QIZ products should be con-
signed directly from Jordan or Israel to the USA,” and must meet minimum 
input requirements from Jordan, Israel, and the USA and/or Palestine. Id; 
see also SAIF, supra note 11, at 12–13. 
 46. MINISTRY OF LABOUR REPORT, supra note 41, at 5–6. 
 47. Id. at 6. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Bustillo, supra note 1; Halaby, supra note 3. As of March 2012, there 
were approximately 335,000 migrant workers in Jordan. See INT’L LABOR 
OFFICE, DECENT WORK COUNTRY PROGRAMME 2012–2015: JORDAN, at 11 
(March 2012) [hereinafter DECENT WORK PROGRAMME], available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/program/dwcp/download/jordan.pdf. 
As many as 54,077 of those workers in 2006 were employed in the QIZ. INT’L 
LABOR OFFICE, DECENT WORK COUNTRY PROGRAMME, at 11 (Jordan 2006) 
[hereinafter Decent Work Programme 2006]. While Jordan’s labor law does 
not discriminate between Jordanian and migrant workers, there are increas-
ing reports of violations and abuse of migrant workers’ rights. Id. With re-
gard to women, abuses included the withholding of salary, long working 
hours without rest periods, the withholding of passports, and physical and 
sexual abuse. See Asia Pacific and Arab States Regional Programme on Em-
powering Women Migrant Workers in Asia: Jordan, U.N. WOMEN, 
http://www.migration-unifem-apas.org/jordan/index.html (last visited Apr. 
26, 2013). 
 50. MINISTRY OF LABOUR REPORT, supra note 41, at 4. 
 51. See note 3 supra. “Unionized Jordanians may only strike with govern-
ment permission; non-Jordanians, although allowed to join unions since 2008, 
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In 2006, the International Labor Organization (“ILO”), a spe-
cialized U.N. agency devoted to “promoting just working condi-
tions,” reported that the Jordanian government had taken 
some measures to improve the protection of migrant workers’ 
rights.52 The ILO saw much room for improvement in Jordan’s 
existing infrastructure for protecting guest workers, and devel-
oped an “Action Plan” for the management of labor migration 
and the protection of migrant workers within Jordan’s bor-
ders.53 This Action Plan was based on the International Labor 
Organization’s non-binding multi-lateral framework on labor 
migration.54 However, the Action Plan has yet to receive official 
endorsement or enforcement by the Jordanian government.55 
                                                                                                                                     
are not allowed to strike.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2010—
JORDAN, http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2010/jordan [hereinafter WORLD 
REPORT 2010]. 
 52. See id. The ILO was created in 1919 and is a tripartite organization 
comprised of three constituencies: governments, employers, and employees. 
See Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International La-
bor Organization (Declaration of Philadelphia), Annex, Oct. 9, 1946, 15 
U.N.T.S. 35, available at http://www.un-documents.net/dec-phil.htm. The 
goal of the organization is to “promote social justice by promoting just work-
ing conditions.” Id. Jordan has ratified a total of twenty-three ILO conven-
tions. DECENT WORK PROGRAMME, supra note 49, at 19. This includes seven of 
the eight fundamental conventions (with the exception of the Freedom of As-
sociation and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87)), and 
three of the four “priority” governance conventions (with the exception of the 
Labor Inspection (Agriculture) Convention (No. 129)). Conventions and Rec-
ommendations, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-
standards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang—en/index.htm (follow hy-
perlink for particular convention, scroll to bottom and select “ratifications by 
country”) (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). The fundamental conventions include: 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 
(No. 87), Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98), 
Forced Labour Convention (No. 29), Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 
(No. 105), Minimum Age Convention (No. 138), Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention (No. 182), Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), Discrimi-
nation (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111). Id. The govern-
ance Conventions include: Labour Inspection Convention (No. 81), Employ-
ment Policy Convention (No. 122), Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Conven-
tion (No. 129), Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) 
Convention (No. 144). Id. 
 53. MINISTRY OF LABOUR REPORT, supra note 41, at 3. 
 54. Id. See note 52 supra. 
 55. Migrants, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/topic/migrants (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). 
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Thus, Jordan currently lacks a method of monitoring factories 
in the QIZs,56 and relies on corporate entities to manage their 
own facilities. However, the numerous human rights violations 
by MNC conscripted factories reported by the IGLHR, such as 
those at Classic, illustrate a lack of enforcement of corporate 
codes of conduct and a lack of monitoring for the safety and 
health of female workers under male supervision in the work 
place.57 
II. THE CEDAW’S APPLICABILITY 
As one of the most widely ratified international human rights 
treaties,58 the CEDAW has the potential to be a powerful tool 
for empowering female factory workers. The CEDAW makes 
State Parties responsible for the discriminatory conduct of non-
state actors, and obligates states to take affirmative steps to 
eliminate those practices.59 The CEDAW addresses systemic 
causes of discrimination and seeks to correct both discrimina-
tory treatment, as well as the discriminatory effects of local 
stereotypes. 60  Combined with this guarantee of substantive 
                                                                                                                                     
 56. Jordanian Ministry on USFTA, supra note 34. Of the currently thir-
teen QIZs in Jordan, only three are governmental while the rest are owned by 
the private sector. Id. Though the Ministry of Labor has a labor inspection 
and complaints mechanism, it has many institutional limitations, such as a 
limited number of labor inspectors, hampering its ability to check the 114 
separate companies and facilities in the QIZ on a consistent basis for human 
rights abuses. MINISTRY OF LABOUR REPORT, supra note 41, at 5, 8. 
 57. See sources cited supra note 3. 
 58. There are only seven states in the world that have not ratified the 
CEDAW: Iran, Palau, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tonga, and the United 
States. CEDAW Status, supra note 19. 
 59. See CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 2(e). 
 60. See id. art 1. “[T]he concept of substantive equality has been defined as 
‘directed at eliminating individual, institutional and systemic discrimination 
against disadvantaged groups which effectively undermines their full and 
equal social, economic, political, and cultural participation in society.’” Jen-
nifer S. Hainsfurther, A Rights-Based Approach: Using CEDAW to Protect the 
Human Rights of Migrant Workers, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 843, 862 (2009) 
(quoting RATNA KAPUR & BRENDA COSSMAN, SUBVERSIVE SITES: FEMINIST 
ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW IN INDIA 176 (1996)). Substantive equality does not 
necessarily mean treating men and women identically; rather, it focuses on 
equal opportunity, access, and outcome. See id. at 868; see also Claire 
L’Heureux-Dubé, It Takes a Vision: The Constitutionalization of Equality in 
Canada, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 363, 368 (2002) (describing substantive 
equality as affording “equality of opportunity and of result, not just similar 
treatment for those similarly situated”). 
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equality, the state obligations detailed in Article 2, prohibiting 
discrimination against women, enable OCWs to claim that a 
state has violated its legal obligations under the CEDAW by 
failing to monitor private employers.61 Given that so many vio-
lations of female OCWs’ rights take place at the hands of pri-
vate actors,62 State Parties’ obligations under Article 2(e), dis-
cussed below, play an essential role in creating the States’ legal 
obligations towards women migrant workers under the 
CEDAW. 
A. Overview of the CEDAW 
The CEDAW contains a broad definition of discrimination 
against women, and describes a number of measures that State 
Parties must take to eliminate discrimination in areas such as 
participation in public life and the political process, education, 
employment, healthcare, economic and social life, and family 
relations.63 Article 2 of the Convention condemns discrimina-
tion against women “in all [its] forms,”64 and Article 3 further 
requires State Parties to take appropriate measures “in all 
fields” 65  to guarantee women’s enjoyment of human rights. 
Since the CEDAW does not distinguish between the rights of 
female citizens and non-citizens,66 it is truly a universal human 
rights treaty fully applicable to the plight of OCWs. 
                                                                                                                                     
 61. See CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 2(e). 
 62. See Rebecca Cook, Accountability in International Law for Violations of 
Women’s Rights by Non-State Actors, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (Dorina Dallmeyer ed., 1993) (“[W]omen’s exposure to 
discrimination and other denials of human rights will originate through acts 
of private persons and institutions, and will continue at this level as women 
mature to recognize parallel denials of rights directly attributable to state 
action that they encounter in the political, economic and other spheres of na-
tional life.”). 
 63. See CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 1. (“For the purposes of the present 
Convention, the term ‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any distinc-
tion, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or 
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of equality of men 
and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.”). See also id. arts. 7–16. 
 64. Id. art. 2. 
 65. Id. art. 3. 
 66. See generally CEDAW, supra note 17. The CEDAW refers to the rights 
of women generally, without any qualification based on citizenship. 
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To interpret the broad spectrum of rights guaranteed under 
the Convention and to create rules of procedure giving effect to 
the Convention’s provisions, Part V of the CEDAW establishes 
the CEDAW Committee—a board of twenty-three experts se-
lected by State Parties.67 The Committee is empowered to make 
general recommendations and suggestions after examining the 
annual progress reports by State Parties on the administration 
of the CEDAW.68 Although these general recommendations are 
not binding, State Parties are generally expected to follow them 
in order to fulfill their obligations under the treaty. 69  The 
Committee also issues “Concluding Comments” to State Parties 
after they submit their progress reports, with specific recom-
mendations for each country to undertake before the next re-
porting deadline.70 
B. The Unique Obligations Imposed by the CEDAW 
Nearly all major human rights instruments—for example, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights—prohibit sex-based discrimination. 71  However, the 
CEDAW is unique in that it deals with discrimination against 
                                                                                                                                     
 67. Id. arts. 17–19. 
 68. Id. arts. 21, 18. Each State Party is required to submit a progress re-
port to the Secretary-General within a year after the CEDAW’s entry into 
force and then at least every four years thereafter, or whenever the CEDAW 
Committee so requests. Id. art. 21. This reporting mechanism is rather weak, 
since responsibility falls primarily on the State Party to submit honest and 
thorough information regarding its own weaknesses and successes in protect-
ing women’s rights. However, the CEDAW does allow for NGOs to present 
“shadow reports” to the Committee as a commentary on the State Party offi-
cial report. Id. art. 18; see also A Note About Shadow Reports, STOP VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN, http://www.stopvaw.org/a_note_about_shadow_reports (last 
updated Nov. 1, 2003). Shadow reports by NGOs can provide reliable and 
independent information to the CEDAW Committee on the actual progress of 
the State Party in implementing and enforcing reform. Id. 
 69. See Hainsfurther, supra note 60, at 860. 
 70. See id. at 857. 
 71. INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNAL LEGAL OBLIGATION OF 
COMPANIES 24 (2002) [hereinafter BEYOND VOLUNTARISM], available at 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/7/107_report_en.pdf. 
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women from a systemic standpoint.72 Article 2(e) of the Con-
vention dictates that State Parties must “take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any 
person, organization, or enterprise.”73  This includes violence 
committed by private citizens.74 The CEDAW Committee estab-
lished that a State Party is liable for failing to protect a woman 
from abuse by her husband, and proposed that a state must act 
“with due diligence to prevent and respond to such violence 
against women.”75 In addition, a State Party is also liable for 
the actions of corporations within its borders under the “due 
diligence” standard.76 The standard, which has been accepted 
by many international tribunals, dictates that: 
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is ini-
tially not directly imputable to a State (for example, because 
it is the act of a private person or because the person respon-
sible has not been identified) can lead to international re-
sponsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but be-
cause of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation [of 
human rights] or to respond to it as required by the Conven-
tion.77 
A state has an obligation to “prevent, investigate, and punish”78 
any violation of the rights in the Convention that occurs within 
                                                                                                                                     
 72. See Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights under the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wom-
en, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1996). 
 73. See CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 2(e). 
 74. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Con-
sideration of Communication No. 2/2003 (A.T. v. Hungary) pursuant to article 
7, paragraph 3 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 9.2, UN Doc. 
CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 (Jan. 26, 2005) (noting that the CEDAW Committee 
held the state had failed to uphold its CEDAW obligations in failing to pro-
tect woman from being battered by her husband). 
 75. Id. ¶ 9.6(II)(f) (explaining that under the CEDAW, a state must 
“[i]nvestigate promptly, thoroughly, impartially and seriously all allegations 
of domestic violence and bring the offenders to justice in accordance with in-
ternational standards.”). 
 76. See Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, 1988 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 172 (July 29, 1988). 
 77. Id. This court was addressing state liability for non-state actions with 
regard to violations of the American Convention on Human Rights. The 
CEDAW Committee has since adopted the “due diligence standard” with re-
gard to the CEDAW. See infra note 79. 
 78. Id. 
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its jurisdiction.79 Thus, a state that fails to monitor and inves-
tigate MNC supplier factories, and fails to hold offenders ac-
countable for abuses against women in the workplace, would 
fail under the due diligence standard of the CEDAW. 
The CEDAW also protects the interests of women with provi-
sions on gender-equality in the workplace. States Parties must 
take all appropriate measures to ensure the right of men and 
women to equal employment opportunities,80 and equal remu-
neration and treatment.81 State Parties must also work to pro-
hibit dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or maternity 
leave,82 and allow for maternity leave “with pay or some com-
parable social benefits without the loss of [] employment, sen-
iority or social allowances.”83 While the CEDAW appears to 
provide broad protections to women in the workplace, a major 
gap exists in that migrant women employed in QIZ factories 
are not protected by Jordan’s normal labor laws that institute 
these protections. 84 This limitation on the scope of enforcement 
of the CEDAW was made as a concession by Jordanian authori-
ties to encourage economic growth in the QIZ. 
Although violence against women is not explicitly mentioned 
in the CEDAW text, in its 1992 General Recommendation, the 
Committee determined that gender-based violence is in fact 
“discrimination” within the meaning of the term, as broadly 
                                                                                                                                     
 79. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, ¶ 9, 
U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992) [hereinafter CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19] (adopting the 
Velasquez-Rodriguez due diligence standard). 
 80. CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 11(1)(b). 
 81. Id. art. 11(1)(d). 
 82. Id. art. 11(2)(a). 
 83. Id. art. 11(2)(b). 
 84. See Statement on Labor Strikes in the Qualifying Industrial Zone 
(QIZ), JORDANIAN LABOR WATCH 2 (2011), 
http://www.phenixcenter.net/en/files/docs/Statement_on_Strikes_in_QIZ_25_
April_2011_copy.pdf (discussing the Jordanian Government’s decision to ex-
clude workers in the QIZ from eligibility for minimum wage). Such exclusions 
have worsened the situation of laborers in the QIZ by favoring MNCs and 
inviting their business, at the expense of worker health, safety, and justice. 
Id. at 2–3. See also Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 8: Equality of 
Rights Between Men and Women, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 
(Mar. 29, 2000). 
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defined in Article 1.85 The Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women, adopted by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly the following year, also recognized the relation-
ship between violence and equality. 
Recognizing that violence against women is a manifestation of 
historically unequal power relations between men and wom-
en, which have led to domination over and discrimination 
against women by men and to the prevention of the full ad-
vancement of women, and the violence against women is one 
of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced 
into a subordinate position compared with men . . .86 
Jordan has taken steps toward addressing violence and sexual 
abuse against domestic guest workers. 87  However, similar 
measures have not been taken to address these issues in the 
public sector of the factory workplace. Sexual harassment, 
abuse, and rape in the context of worker-supervisor relation-
ships is clearly within the purview of the Convention and thus 
Jordan is obliged to take measures to combat these types of vio-
lence.88 Yet, in spite of Jordan’s professed commitment to en-
suring equal rights and protecting women migrant workers,89 
and in spite of its obligation to address violence against women 
“in all fields,” there is no law within the Jordanian civil or pe-
nal code defining and forbidding sexual harassment in the 
workplace or in other public areas.90 
                                                                                                                                     
 85. CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 79, ¶ 6 (interpreting articles of the 
CEDAW that are relevant to violence against women and making recommen-
dations to states to address this issue). 
 86. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 
48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
 87. See DECENT WORK PROGRAMME, supra note 49, at 18. 
 88. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 89. See MINISTRY OF LABOUR REPORT, supra note 41, at 9 (discussing Jor-
dan’s commitment to migrant worker’s rights through its UNIFEM project). 
 90. See Preserving Rights, JORDAN TIMES (Aug. 29, 2011), 
http://jordantimes.com/preserving-rights; see also AMIRA EL-AZHARY SONBOL, 
WOMEN OF JORDAN: ISLAM, LABOR & THE LAW, 114 (2003). The Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (“CEACR”), 
the legal body responsible for examining compliance by ILO member-states 
with the Convention recommended in 2010 that Jordan include “a clear defi-
nition of what constitutes sexual harassment in the workplace” and “take 
appropriate measures to raise awareness of and prevent and protect against 
sexual harassment in the workplace.” Although Jordan has apparently made 
amendments to the Labour Code (Act No. 48 of 2008), in particular section 29 
that provides for sanctions in the case of sexual assault by an employer), the 
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C. Intersectionality Between Marginalized Status and Sexual 
Violence 
The experience of female guest workers in Jordan must be 
understood not only through the eyes of a woman, but also from 
the perspective of an immigrant and ethnic minority. “[L]egal 
policies at the national and international levels continue to be 
framed with inadequate knowledge of, and responsiveness to, 
the distinct experiences of female migrants.”91 Gender-based 
discrimination intersects with discrimination based on other 
forms of otherness, such as immigrant or foreigner status, race, 
ethnicity, religion, and economic status. These multiple forms 
of discrimination place migrant women in the QIZ in situations 
of double, triple, or even quadruple the disadvantage, margin-
alization, and vulnerability. 
Human Rights Watch reports that in general, “many mi-
grants silently accept the exploitation and deprivation of their 
rights because they view themselves as powerless and without 
effective remedy.”92 This vulnerability is due in part to the con-
centration of women migrant workers in certain occupations 
such as textile manufacturing—a sector that is not covered by 
Jordan’s normal labor codes.93 The kafala sponsorship system94 
in the Middle East contributes to this vulnerability in that it 
makes each worker’s sponsor or employer almost completely 
                                                                                                                                     
CEACR noted, “it remains doubtful whether the legislation is effectively ad-
dressing all forms of sexual harassment.” Direct Request of the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Discrimi-
nation (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111)—Jordan, 
81st Sess. (2010). 
 91. Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 32, at 48. 
 92. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BAD DREAMS: EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE OF 
MIGRANT WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA 5 (2004) [hereinafter BAD DREAMS]. 
 93. See note 84 supra and accompanying text. 
 94. See Middle East: End ‘Sponsored’ Gateway to Human Trafficking, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/14/middle-east-end-sponsored-gateway-
human-trafficking [hereinafter End ‘Sponsored’ Gateway to Human Traffick-
ing]; see also Azfar Khan & Hélène Harroff-Tavel, Presentation: The Implica-
tions of the Sponsorship System: Challenges and Opportunities, 
http://www.unescap.org/sdd/meetings/beirut-June2011/Harroff-ILO-
Implications-of-the-sponsorship-system.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) (“[The] 
kafala system is denounced globally as [a] system of structural dependence 
between an employer and migrant worker[.] . . . [It] provides the legal basis 
for the residency and employment of migrant workers[.]”). 
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responsible for the worker.95 A strong criticism of the kafala 
system is that, “[i]n combination with gaps in labor protections 
. . . the kafala system gives employers tremendous control over 
workers”96 since employees feel indebted to their sponsors for 
the mere opportunity to work. Jordan also mandates that em-
ployers in the QIZ be responsible for repatriating the migrant 
factory workers upon termination of their employment. Mi-
grant workers who cannot afford the plane fare back to Bang-
ladesh, Sri Lanka, or China therefore have no choice but to 
continue to work for their employer. These workers cannot 
leave until their employer unilaterally decides that they are no 
longer needed, or allows them to work for another employer.97 
Otherwise, women may quit their jobs and be deported, likely 
without compensation for whatever abuses and wage theft 
were perpetrated against them at the factory. 98  Therefore, 
women that want to work in Jordan may have to endure what-
ever conditions their employers place them in.99 
Notwithstanding the known risks to their safety and free-
dom, female workers have increasingly turned to jobs in low-
wage factory settings.100 “Third World women have become the 
new ‘factory girls,’ providing cheap labor for globetrotting cor-
porations.” 101  While a female assembly line worker in the 
                                                                                                                                     
 95. See Ministry of Labour, Instructions for the Conditions and Procedures 
of Bringing and Employing Non-Jordanian Workers in the Qualified Indus-
trial Zones issued pursuant to Labour Law Art. 12, Regulation No. 36 (1997) 
(Jordan) [hereinafter QIZ Regulation of Fees], available at 
http://www.mol.gov.jo/Portals/1/qize.pdf. Both IGLHR’s 2008 and 2011 publi-
cations on factory abuse in Jordan reported employers withholding workers’ 
passports, forcing workers to work long hours without rest, working overtime 
without pay, inadequate food and housing conditions, among other abuses. 
The women subjected to such conditions reported feeling trapped without any 
form of redress, fearing termination and deportation if they complained. See 
generally SEXUAL PREDATORS, supra note 3. 
 96. See End ‘Sponsored’ Gateway to Human Trafficking, supra note 94. 
 97. See id. Human Rights Watch reports that most governments in the 
Middle East require workers to obtain their sponsor’s written consent before 
allowing them to take up new employment. See id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See LIM, supra note 10, at 16. 
 100. Id. at 34–35 (discussing how the feminization of poverty affects the 
incentives to migrate and the role a woman’s lack of education may play in 
the decision to enter a demeaning work environment). 
 101. ANNETTE FUENTES & BARBARA EHRENREICH, WOMEN IN THE GLOBAL 
FACTORY 5 (1983). 
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United States is likely to earn between US$5 and US$9.19 an 
hour,102 in Jordan, the minimum wage is between US$7 and 
US$8 a day.103 Some have pointed out: 
Low wages are the main reason companies move to the Third 
World . . . Corporate executives, with their eyes glued to the 
bottom line, wonder why they should pay someone in Massa-
chusetts on an hourly basis what someone in the Philippines 
will earn in a day. And, for that matter, why pay a male 
worker anywhere to do what a female worker can be hired to 
do for 40 to 60 percent less?104 
Female workers have historically been subject to inequality 
and abuses in the workplace. For that reason, the CEDAW 
plays a crucial role in guaranteeing their human rights are re-
spected in such an exploitative environment. Women migrant 
workers are exposed to harassment, intimidation or threats to 
themselves and their families, economic and sexual exploita-
tion, racial discrimination and xenophobia, poor working condi-
tions, increased health risks, and other forms of abuse—
including trafficking into forced labor, debt bondage, involun-
tary servitude and situations of captivity.105 
In Jordan, women guest workers are more vulnerable to dis-
crimination, exploitation, and abuse relative not only to male 
migrants but also to native-born women.106 Until recently, mi-
grant workers in Jordan were not permitted to join labor un-
                                                                                                                                     
 102. See Minimum Wage Laws in the States—January 1, 2013, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm (last visited Apr. 
16, 2013). 
 103. 2008 Human Rights Report: Jordan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR (Feb. 25, 2009) 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119118.htm. As of 2009, the 
minimum wage in Jordan is 110 Jordanian dinars (€109) or US$154 per 
month. Jordan Ministry of Labor inspectors enforce the minimum wage for 
Jordanians but due to limited resources, are unable to ensure full compliance 
by all employers. Id. 
 104. FUENTES & EHRENREICH, supra note 101, at 5–6. See also Laura Fitz-
patrick, Why Do Women Still Earn Less Than Men?, TIME (Apr. 20, 2010) 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1983185,00.html#ixzz1clZDv
1YI. 
 105. See LIM, supra note 10, at 9–28. 
 106. Id. at 13–14. In Jordan, the Ministry of Labor is actively working to 
substitute Jordanians into jobs held by migrant workers in the QIZ. However, 
there has not been much voluntary movement into those positions by Jorda-
nian’s given the low wages and demeaning work conditions associated with 
the positions. See QIZ Regulation of Fees, supra note 95. 
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ions, and currently, Jordan still does not allow migrant work-
ers to strike against employers.107 Thus, women in MNC sup-
plier factories lack negotiation power and are unable to react 
against abuse and breaches of their human rights unless some 
other agency assists in the complaint process. For this reason, 
female guest workers are among the most vulnerable persons 
in society to sexual harassment and rape.108 Additionally, be-
cause such women have limited standing in society, and limited 
access to the legal process, the need to protect them is much 
higher. 
Fortunately, there is a growing international consensus to 
prevent and combat sexual harassment in the workplace, 
which is considered a form of violence against women.109 India’s 
landmark case, Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan,110 is a beacon of 
hope for the human right to be free from sex-based violence by 
employers. The Indian Supreme Court held that the guarantee 
of equality for women should be interpreted in light of the prin-
ciple that “[g]ender equality includes protection from sexual 
harassment and the right to work with dignity.”111 The Vishaka 
court concluded that the complete absence of a sexual harass-
ment law and damages remedy in Rajasthan violated global 
norms and constitutional human rights guarantees. 112  The 
court reasoned that with sexual harassment laws in place, and 
enforced, more women may feel comfortable coming forward to 
report systemic abuses by private actors and states may move 
toward effective deterrence of such violations.113 
The CEDAW Committee has authored several Comments 
discussing the specific problems of migrant women. These 
Comments called upon states to “monitor closely the terms and 
                                                                                                                                     
 107. See WORLD REPORT 2010, supra note 51. 
 108. INT’L LABOR ORG., IN SEARCH OF DECENT WORK—MIGRANT WORKERS’ 
RIGHTS: A MANUAL FOR TRADE UNIONISTS 25 (2008), available at 
http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/uploads/gmg-
topics/labour/ILO_A_manual_for_trade_unionists_ILO_2008.pdf. 
 109. See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. 
Res. 48/104, supra note 86; Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 
Rep. in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/85, 
¶¶ 42–50, Comm’n on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1997/47 (Feb. 5, 1996) (by 
Radhika Coomaraswamy). 
 110. Vishaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 (India). 
 111. Id. ¶ 10. 
 112. See id. ¶¶ 10, 14. 
 113. See id. ¶ 7. 
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conditions of contracts, conditions of work and salaries of wom-
en migrants, and devise strategies and policies for their full 
integration in the labour force and for elimination of direct and 
indirect discrimination.”114 The Comments recommended that 
in following these guidelines, states should “focus on the causes 
of women’s migration and to develop policies and measures to 
protect migrant women against exploitation and abuse.”115 In 
addition, states should “take more effective measures to elimi-
nate discrimination against refugee migrant, and minority 
women and girls.” 116  However, even these recommended 
measures fail to adequately address the problem of intersec-
tionality faced by female migrant factory workers in Jordan, a 
concept that is integral to assessing liability for sexually-based 
human rights abuses. 
Professor Kimberle Crenshaw, who writes extensively on crit-
ical race theory, reflected that, “battering and rape, once seen 
as private (family matters) and aberrational (errant sexual ag-
gression), are now largely recognized as part of a broad-scale 
system of domination that affects women as a class.”117 In the 
specific context of rape and sexual harassment in the work 
place, where male employers exercise domination over female 
workers, there are many sex, gender, race, and ethnic stereo-
types at play. Although the CEDAW and CEDAW Committee 
partly address these issues using notions of substantive and 
procedural equality, they fail to explicitly draw the connection 
between isolated crimes of sexual abuse and harassment, and 
the context of systemic discrimination and coercion that often 
makes such crimes possible. In the corporate factory setting, 
                                                                                                                                     
 114. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Conclud-
ing Comments: of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women: Cyprus, 35th Sess., May 15–June 2, 2006, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/5 (May 30, 2006). 
 115. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Conclud-
ing Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women: Cambodia, 34th Sess., Jan. 16–Feb. 3, 2006, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/KHM/CO/3 (Jan. 25, 2006). 
 116. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Conclud-
ing Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women: Australia, 34th Sess., Jan. 16–Feb. 3, 2006, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/AUL/CO/5 (Feb. 3, 2006). 
 117. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1241 
(1991). 
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this parallel is especially important because workplace rape 
and harassment gain their lifeblood from corporate complicity 
in those, among other, human rights violations. 
The recognition of crimes once thought to be individualistic, 
as social and systemic, is an important shift towards holding 
MNCs responsible for the conditions in subcontractor factories 
that facilitate the sexual abuse this Note seeks to address. It is 
crucial to understand that while women suffer many of the 
same types of human rights violations, the experience of every 
woman whose rights the CEDAW seeks to protect is different. 
Such differences in experience may compound a woman’s vul-
nerability to, and degree of, abuse suffered. Accordingly, this 
increased vulnerability should be taken into account by State 
Parties when adopting measures to address these human 
rights violations and when assessing the degree of intervention 
required of states by the CEDAW. Female guest workers need 
special protection from Jordanian authorities to come forward 
and vindicate their rights, to avoid being shamed, silenced, de-
ported, and forgotten. 
III. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
In the private sector, MNCs have adopted codes of conduct in 
response to accusations of irresponsibility in monitoring gar-
ment factories.118 Jordan only began inspecting private sector 
workplaces in 2004; it has less than eighty inspectors to enforce 
all labor laws in more than 55,000 companies and factories.119 
Like other developing countries, Jordan relies on corporate en-
forcement of internal codes of conduct in lieu of government 
oversight of supplier factories.120 These codes of conduct are 
                                                                                                                                     
 118. See generally Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe- Darricarrère, Enforc-
ing International Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 663 (1995) (discussing the development of external 
and internal codes of conduct for international business operations). 
 119. SOLIDARITY CENTER, JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER 
RIGHTS IN JORDAN 33–34 (2005), available at 
www.solidaritycenter.org/files/JordanFinal.pdf. “One way to reduce gender 
and ethnic inequities in the workplace is through strong enforcement of labor 
law, using a system of consistent inspection. But Jordan’s labor inspection 
service is ineffective and not always enforced.” Id. at 33. 
 120. See Richard Locke et al., Beyond Corporate Codes of Conduct: Work 
Organization and Labour Standards at Nike’s Suppliers, 146 INT’L LABOUR 
REV. 21, 22–23 (2007). 
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voluntary121 and have inherent shortcomings due their limited 
scope and lack of meaningful enforcement.122 For example, the 
language of MNC codes of conduct has historically been more 
aspirational than a hard and fast legal policy. 123  However, 
MNCs have recently begun to use codes of conduct as contrac-
tual instruments, rather than idealistic goals, to set guidelines 
for their suppliers.124 Therefore, while MNCs have traditionally 
claimed innocence when a subcontractor committed a violation, 
given the shift in the understanding of codes of conduct as en-
forceable contracts, ignorance of a subcontractor’s noncompli-
ance can no longer separate an MNC from the abuses it bene-
fits from. 
Human rights abuses in the MNC textile industry occur 
mainly within the supply chain.125 Therefore, the issue arises 
as to whether MNCs may be held responsible and liable for 
human rights violations of their supplier factories. Like many 
companies in the manufacturing sector, the MNCs utilizing the 
services of factories like Classic rely on a “triangle” manufac-
turing system.126 The recent economic developments in Jordan 
provide a perfect illustration of this system, where MNCs out-
source labor-intensive products to subcontracted companies in 
newly industrialized, low-wage countries. 127  This business 
strategy provides an inherent separation between MNCs (being 
the parent companies) and their subcontractors which are con-
sidered independent legal entities.128 This position of independ-
ence from the subcontractors allows MNCs to place the blame 
for human rights violations onto their supplier plants to protect 
                                                                                                                                     
 121. For example, U.S. President Clinton announced a voluntary code of 
human rights principles for American companies operating abroad. See David 
E. Sanger, Clinton to Urge a Rights Code for Businesses Dealing Abroad, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at D1. 
 122. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrère, supra note 118, at 686–89 (dis-
cussing that while it is easy to draft a corporate code of conduct, “effective 
implementation is the real test” of the corporation’s commitment to human 
rights). 
 123. Maryanov, supra note 13, at 407–08. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Caroline Kaeb, Emerging Issues of Human Rights Responsibility in 
the Extractive and Manufacturing Industries: Patterns and Liability Risks, 6 
NW. U.J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 327, ¶ 54 (2008). 
 126. See id. ¶ 56. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
1322 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:3 
their own brand reputation—just as Macy’s, Kohl’s, and Lands’ 
End attempted to do in the Classic case.129 However, for the 
CEDAW to have legal teeth in Jordan’s QIZ factory context, 
MNCs must be held accountable for the work environments of 
their supplier factories since it is the MNCs that are effectively 
making the labor policies through their action and inaction. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, in Doe I v. Un-
ocal Corp., 130  set a valuable precedent in the international 
community that a company can be liable for knowingly aiding 
and abetting a state actor to commit human rights abuses, 
such as forced labor, murder, rape, and torture, by providing 
“practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which 
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”131 
                                                                                                                                     
 129. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 130. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’g in part and 
aff’g in part 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000), vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
 131. Id. at 950. This case was brought in a federal district court against 
Unocal Corporation for the use of forced labor in Unocal’s gas pipeline project 
in Burma. The case is notable because of its two seemingly conflicting opin-
ions. The first judge who presided in the case issued an opinion that estab-
lished that Unocal, as an MNC, could be sued for violations of international 
law under the ATCA—specifically, for continuing to employ the Burmese mil-
itary, even after knowing of the military’s use of forced labor. Id. The case 
was reheard and affirmed in part and vacated in part, and in a subsequent 
opinion issued by a different circuit court judge, the case was dismissed and 
the district court decision vacated. Doe v. Unocal, 403 F.3d 708. The district 
court decision upon remand from the 2002 decision found that Unocal’s ac-
tions were not sufficient to create liability, because Unocal had not affirma-
tively sought out forced labor for the pipeline. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1310. The 
two opinions provide conflicting accounts of the kind of MNC conduct that is 
sufficient to trigger possible corporate liability. However, in the case of Jor-
dan’s QIZ factories, it seems that MNCs affirmatively seek out companies 
with the lowest cost of labor in order to gain the greatest profit, however low-
er labor costs are correlative with lower labor standards and an increased 
number of human rights violations. See Miles Wolpin, Fair Labor Standards, 
Economic Well-Being and Human Rights as Costs of “Free-Trade,” INT’L 
JOURNAL PEACE STUDIES, n.10, 
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol2_1/Wolpin.htm. “[L]ack of safe 
working conditions and independent unions in Mexico contribute to phenom-
enally low labor costs, thus creating an unfair trade advantage.” Id. (quoting 
Thomas Karter, Free Trade Agreement is President Bush’s Class Act, IN 
THESE TIMES, Nov. 1992, at 11, 16) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Since 
Mexico has much lower wages and a poor record of enforcing its often weaker 
environmental and consumer laws, U.S. businesses would have a strong in-
centive to move across the border.” Id. (quoting Public Health Achievements 
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Furthermore, even if the corporation has not actively partici-
pated in human rights abuses carried out by state actors, “a 
company that voluntarily enters a business environment, or 
stays there, when they know or should know that they are 
somehow benefiting from ongoing human rights violations, has, 
at least, a moral duty to take reasonable steps to prevent or 
stop the violations.”132 
In the case of Jordan, reports of sexual abuse in MNC facto-
ries have been present since 2006.133 Furthermore, allegations 
of rape and sexual assault of female workers by Classic super-
visors were specifically brought to Wal-Mart and Target’s at-
tention at least as early as 2008, when female workers at the 
Ad Dulayl Industrial Zone went on strike to resist workplace 
abuse.134 However, neither corporation took an active position 
on the matter, and Wal-Mart in particular maintained that the 
allegations lacked evidentiary support.135 Wal-Mart and Target 
continued to use Classic’s products, without any changes to 
their codes of conduct or enforcement mechanisms, and even 
continued to employ the supervisors that were repeatedly ac-
cused of engaging in these heinous activities.136 Critics of MNC 
self-regulation have pointed out that MNCs find greater com-
pliance in supplier plants when they schedule factory inspec-
tions in advance. This allows the plants to prepare viewing ar-
eas, and select and coach the workers that will be interviewed, 
as was the case in the 2011 Classic rape investigation.137 In-
deed, inadequate monitoring of factories by the state and con-
tracting MNCs creates an “environment of impunity” 138  for 
subcontractor and supervisor abuse of workers. 
                                                                                                                                     
Endangered by North American Free Trade Agreement, PUB. CITIZEN HEALTH 
RES. GROUP HEALTH LETTER, Mar. 1993, at 8–9) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 132. BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 71, at 132. 
 133. See, e.g., HUMAN TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, supra note 9, 
at 16, 20. 
 134. See Human Trafficking and Abusive Conditions at the Mediterranean 
Garments Factory in the Ad Dulayl Industrial Zone in Jordan, NAT’L LABOR 
COMM., http://www.globallabourrights.org/reports?id=0530 (last updated 
Sept. 6, 2008). 
 135. See Bustillo, supra note 1. 
 136. See supra notes 25–26. 
 137. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 138. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SWEPT UNDER THE RUG: ABUSES AGAINST 
DOMESTIC WORKERS AROUND THE WORLD 34 (2006). 
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The corporate entities that knowingly continued to engage in 
business with Classic, despite the reported abuses, may be seen 
as aiding and abetting the sexual assault and harassment car-
ried out by supervisors at the factory.139 Though the concept of 
corporate liability for aiding and abetting human rights abuses 
stemmed from U.S. cases, such as Unocal, the International 
Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunals for 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have explicitly incorpo-
rated this standard into their statutes for liability of non-state 
actors.140 Thus, the crime of aiding and abetting has been ap-
plied in an international context,141 and it would not be a far 
reach for Jordan to institute a similar statute in its civil laws 
with respect to the sexual abuse and harassment of women in 
the workplace. 
While a corporation technically cannot rape an employee, its 
role is analogous to knowingly supplying a perpetrator with the 
place, authority, opportunity, and funds to carry out rape, 
physical assault, forced labor, and other human rights abus-
es.142 Acknowledging corporations as tortfeasors is essential to 
                                                                                                                                     
 139. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 140. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25, ¶ 3(c), July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 6, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 827, 
art. 7, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 141. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 71, at 55–58. 
 142. See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the 
Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 336–37 (1985). 
[T]he doctrine of complicity (sometimes referred to as the law of aid-
ing and abetting, or accessorial liability) emerges to define the cir-
cumstances in which one person (to whom I will refer to as the sec-
ondary party or actor, accomplice, or accessory) becomes liable for 
the crime of another. . . . The nature of complicity liability follows 
from the considerations that called it forth. The secondary party’s li-
ability is derivative, which is to say, it is incurred by virtue of a vio-
lation of law by the primary party to which the secondary party con-
tributed. It is not direct [liability]. . . . One who “aids and abets” [the 
primary party] to do these acts, in the traditional language of the 
common law, can be liable for doing so, but not because she has 
thereby caused the actions of the principal or because the actions of 
the principal are her acts. Her liability must rest on the violation of 
law by the principal, the legal consequences of which she incurs be-
cause of her own actions. It is important not to misconstrue deriva-
tive liability as imparting vicarious liability. Accomplice liability 
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holding them accountable for their actions, or inactions, in or-
der to promote the welfare of migrant women in Jordan and 
improve their work environment. The sexual and non-sexual 
abuses carried out at Classic were one of many factors that 
served to frighten the female workers at the factory, and coerce 
them into doing exactly as their supervisors demanded. Many 
of these demands, such as working overtime, and working 
without pay or rest, directly benefited the MNC contracting 
parties’ interests by keeping costs low and ensuring an effi-
cient, obedient work force.143 
While criminal prosecutions are currently used to hold the 
factory supervisors charged with these abuses liable, they are 
an inadequate legal remedy. Since individual criminal prosecu-
tions “focus attention on personal guilt and away from struc-
tural or systemic causes,”144 these trials do not address the full 
problem of discrimination. For example, as seen in the United 
States and abroad, even the death penalty does not deter vio-
lent behavior when the root causes of such behavior are sys-
temic and societal in nature.145 Though criminal prosecutions 
are necessary to deter individuals from committing crimes 
against vulnerable populations, the CEDAW aims to address 
the root causes of violence against women. In the case of Jor-
dan’s QIZ factories, corporate complicity in abusive workplace 
environments is a main reason such violence against migrant 
women in the QIZ persists.146 Such abuse will sadly continue so 
                                                                                                                                     
does not involve imposing liability on one party for the wrongs of an-
other solely because of the relationship between the parties. Liability 
requires action by the secondary actor . . . that makes it appropriate 
to blame him for what the primary actor does. The term “derivative” 
as used here merely means that her liability is dependent on the 
principal violating the law. 
Id. 
 143. See infra notes 146, 174–76 and accompanying text. 
 144. HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1368 (2007). 
 145. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at ¶ 120 (S. Afr.) (“Home-
lessness, unemployment, poverty and the frustration consequent upon such 
conditions are other causes of the crime wave.”). 
 146. The USFTA supports the claim that “economic well-being will be max-
imized by each country’s specialization in producing at the lowest possible 
cost those exports in which it has a “comparative advantage.” See Wolpin, 
supra note 131. Jordan’s comparative advantage happens to be cheap labor. 
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long as MNCs continue to prioritize profits and consumer satis-
faction over the human rights of the workers in the supplier 
plants. 
There is no consensus in the international community as to 
whether a corporation may be held liable for international hu-
man rights abuses.147 While it is clear that non-state actors op-
erating under the color of the law may be penalized for commit-
ting abuses, including aiding and abetting such abuses, corpo-
                                                                                                                                     
This directly impacts labor because standards are deregulated in order to 
increase capital and maintain this advantage. 
The transnational corporations generally have had an edge over na-
tional unions. Labor is less mobile than capital (since labor is tied to 
a particular community or region), and can protest only within the 
boundaries of the nation-state. But capital is highly mobile because 
it can move from one nation to another in search of labor, raw mate-
rials, credit, and markets. Each move across national boundaries, 
therefore, strengthens transnational capital at the expense of the 
national labor unions, local communities, and the nation-state, lead-
ing to loss of jobs, decrease in tax revenues, and dislocation of the 
national economy . . . . At its essence, then, “free trade” is more 
about unrestricted profit maximization and capital mobility . . . than 
eliminating residual barriers to trade in goods and services [in order 
to enrich the economies of all nations involved in the treaty]. 
Id. 
 147. While there are cases in which corporate entities have been found 
guilty of crimes, there have been no civil cases against corporate entities for 
violations of human rights which do not fall under crimes of universal juris-
diction. For example, in the war crimes trials at Nuremberg, corporations 
were implicated for the crimes of their directors in United States v. Krupp, see 
Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon—An 
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Mul-
tinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 112 (2002), and were im-
plicated as criminal instrumentalities in United States v. Krauch, see id. at 
106. Corporations may be held criminally liable under theories of agency, 
aiding and abetting, and accomplice liability. See generally Eric Engle, Extra-
territorial Corporate Criminal Liability: A Remedy for Human Rights Viola-
tions?, 20 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 287 (2006). However, in order to be held civil-
ly liable before a U.S. court, corporations need to be acting under the color of 
the law, or be a “willful participant in joint action with the State or its 
agents.” See Ramasastry, supra, at 137. There is no cause of action for a cor-
poration that is merely complicit in human rights abuses, independent of 
state action, for its own benefit. Under Article 2(e) of the CEDAW, the state 
may be held liable for failing to stop abuses against women by private actors. 
See supra note 74 and accompanying text. However, this does not provide 
victims of sexual abuse an actionable claim against the corporate entities 
themselves. 
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rations occupy an amorphous position. Indeed, over two centu-
ries ago Edward, the First Baron of Thurlow, remarked that, 
“[c]orporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to 
be condemned. They therefore do as they like.”148 Recent U.S. 
litigation, questioning the principles of Doe v. Unocal, shows 
that the Baron’s observation still rings true and further ob-
scures whether individuals have a cause of action against cor-
porations.149 However, U.S. MNCs are still subject to the law of 
their host nation.150 The treatment of MNC liability under in-
ternational and U.S. law sheds light on what Jordan can—and 
must—do in order to discharge its duties to respect, protect, 
and fulfill the rights of women in the factory workplace. The 
solution advanced must thus be broad enough to encompass the 
actions of contractors at all levels in the MNC supply chain, 
with a focus on changing both national and corporate fair labor 
enforcement mechanisms. 
IV. WORKING TOWARDS ERADICATING SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE 
WORKPLACE 
A. A Civil Cause of Action Against MNCs for Sexual Abuse 
Committed by their Subcontractors 
After a visit to Jordan in November 2011, Rashida Manjoo, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 
warned Jordanian authorities about the nation’s lack of efforts 
                                                                                                                                     
 148. Ramasastry, supra note 147, at 91. 
 149. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that 
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) was not applicable to corporation); Ki-
obel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding oil 
corporation sued for aiding and abetting violations of human rights by Nige-
rian government, and corporations in general, cannot be sued for violations of 
the “law of nations” under the ATCA), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 472 (2011). The 
U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel. 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10–1491, 2013 WL 1628935 (U.S. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 17, 2013). The Supreme Court concluded that where there is 
only a weak connection to the United States, the perpetrators of serious hu-
man rights abuses committed abroad cannot be held to account using the 
ATCA. Id., at *6. However, the Supreme Court did not decide on the issue of 
whether U.S. corporations can altogether be held liable under the statute for 
human rights violations abroad. 
 150. See Engle, supra note 147, at 288. 
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to address sexual abuse and harassment.151 She noted that alt-
hough many individuals she interviewed did not identify these 
as national problems, “it is necessary to acknowledge that sex-
ual violence and sexual harassment occur both within and out-
side the family in every society.”152 Ms. Manjoo explained that, 
“the fact that certain subjects might be considered taboo within 
a society that largely describes itself as traditional, conserva-
tive, patriarchal and tribal might explain women’s silence with 
regard to these manifestations of violence.”153 
Contrary to Jordanian claims, sexual harassment is not a 
purely Western occurrence. Along with India’s Vishaka deci-
sion in 1987,154 other developing nations have begun to imple-
ment laws against sexual harassment as necessary to attain 
equal rights for women. In 2004, Morocco made an important 
change to its Labor Code, introducing the concept of sexual 
harassment in the workplace. 155  In 2009, using Vishaka as 
precedent, the Bangladeshi High Court (“High Court”) issued a 
decision defining sexual harassment and the steps employers 
must take to protect against it.156 In its interpretation of the 
nation’s constitution, the High Court considered Article 11 of 
the CEDAW on equality in employment, and the CEDAW 
Committee’s General Recommendation No. 19 on violence 
against women.157 The High Court noted, “harrowing tales of 
repression and sexual abuse of women at their workplaces, ed-
ucational institutions and other Government and Non-
Governmental organizations,”158 and “recognized that equality 
in employment can be seriously impaired when women are sub-
jected to gender specific violence.”159 
Jordan’s apparent denial of the problem’s existence does little 
to advance its women workers’ rights. By failing to address the 
                                                                                                                                     
 151. Jordan must act to end violence against women, UN rights expert says, 
U.N. NEWS CTR. (Nov 24, 2011), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40507&Cr=violence%20agai
nst%20women&Cr1=#.UXG7NLXqn94. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See notes 110–13 supra and accompanying text. 
 155. See CEDAW Success Stories, UNIFEM, 
http://www.unifem.org/cedaw30/success_stories/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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sexual harassment and abuse of female workers, Jordan is ef-
fectively in violation of its duties under the CEDAW that re-
quire it to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrim-
ination against women by any person, organization or enter-
prise.”160 Thus, Jordan is necessarily failing to exercise due dil-
igence in ending abuses against women.161 
The CEDAW Committee issued a general recommendation 
addressing states’ obligations to solve the problem of violence 
against women. General Recommendation No. 19 noted that 
under the CEDAW states must take steps to provide the follow-
ing: 
(i) Effective legal measures, including penal sanctions, civil 
remedies, and compensatory provisions to protect women 
against all kinds of violence, including violence and abuse in 
the family, sexual assault and sexual harassment in the 
workplace. 
(ii)  Preventative measures, including public information and 
education programs to change attitudes concerning the roles 
and status of men and women. 
(iii) Protective measures, including refuges, counseling, reha-
bilitation, and support services for women who are the victims 
of violence or who are at risk of violence.162 
In order to fulfill the positive rights propounded by the 
CEDAW, Jordan must institute laws against sexual harass-
ment and create effective and confidential avenues for com-
plaints against employers. Without doing so and enforcing such 
laws, Jordan is responsible for the actions of corporate bodies 
that facilitate human rights violations against women under 
the CEDAW’s Article 2(e) provisions.163 Jordan is in a position 
to enforce human rights standards among those companies 
privileged to do business within its borders. 
                                                                                                                                     
 160. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 162. BAD DREAMS, supra note 92, at 64. 
 163. See supra note 73–77 and accompanying text. See also BAD DREAMS, 
supra note 92, at 64 (citing the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women—the obligation of state governments to prevent, investigate, 
and punish acts of violence against women apply regardless of “whether those 
acts are perpetuated by the State or by private persons.”). 
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In addition to the substantive equality provisions, Article 2(c) 
recognizes the “strong symbiosis”164 between the successful en-
forcement of laws protecting women’s rights and judicial ac-
tion.165 Sections (1) and (2) of Article 15 of the CEDAW elabo-
rate on the legal status of women in their requirement that 
women receive equal status with men under the law, in the 
form of equal legal capacity and equal opportunity to exercise 
such rights in civil matters, such as court proceedings.166 In 
light of these provisions, it is clear that in order to achieve sub-
stantive gender equality, Jordan must institute mechanisms 
for women to obtain legal redress through the courts for sexual 
abuse by workplace officials. Women must be able to obtain le-
gal redress without fear of retaliation by employers, and with-
out fear of the social or cultural repercussions that accompany 
discussion of a women’s sexual activity. To accomplish the lat-
ter, there must be a means of educating the public and working 
women in particular of women’s rights under domestic and in-
ternational law. 
By providing women workers protection in reporting abuses 
and an avenue of relief through the courts, Jordan would have 
a way to gauge which factories and corporations are commit-
ting violations. It can then more efficiently monitor those enti-
ties given its limited inspection capacity.167 Moreover, corpora-
tions would be compelled to enforce human rights and the 
rights of women within factories to avoid scrutiny, liability, and 
bad press. But, it is not only due to “[p]overty, lack of re-
sources, and weak governmental capacity . . . [that] developing 
countries [fail to] effectively enforce labor standards. Some also 
lack the political will to do so.”168 In failing to institute such 
procedures to date, an underlying concern for Jordan is un-
doubtedly the effect of the reforms on its relationship with cor-
porations and factory administrators. 
                                                                                                                                     
 164. Arnold, supra note 19, at 1380. 
 165. See CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 2(c). 
 166. See id. art. 15(1)–15(2). 
 167. See note 119 supra. 
 168. KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, LABOR STANDARDS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CAFTA, 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY BRIEFS 4 (2004). 
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B. The Effect of Protection Against Sexual Harassment on MNC 
Activity Within Jordan 
Economic growth and social development are not mutually 
exclusive. “[M]arkets can flourish and sustainable economic 
prosperity can be achieved only if there is a democratic and ef-
fective State that provides, through rules and institutions, an 
enabling environment for private sector development and eco-
nomic growth.”169 Thus, it is Jordan’s duty under the CEDAW, 
and to some extent under the USFTA, to consider female mi-
grant workers’ rights and the workplace abuses documented 
against them when delineating guidelines for corporate indus-
trial operations within Jordan’s borders. Such considerations 
entail not only the rights of women, but also the status and 
sustainability of MNC ventures. 
Concededly, there is a significant imbalance in bargaining 
power between Western conglomerates and developing coun-
tries such as Jordan.170 Jordan has thus far taken an accom-
modating stance on the operations of MNCs in the QIZ for fear 
that companies will relocate to countries with even lower labor 
and human rights standards and laxer enforcement. 171  One 
QIZ manager of a large supplier plant for Victoria’s Secret, 
NIKE, Calvin Klein, and Target explained that “any rises in 
production costs . . . would cause Tefron [a distributor for the 
above-mentioned American companies] to move operations to 
Egypt since garment companies are generally only interested 
in the ‘bottom-line.’”172 Female guest workers’ rights will not be 
vindicated if MNCs retreat entirely from using QIZ factory la-
bor, or are unable to achieve a profit from conducting business 
in the QIZ; however, concerns about sexually violent work con-
ditions cannot simply be ignored. 
                                                                                                                                     
 169. GUIDO BERTUCCI & ADRIANA ALBERTI, GLOBALIZATION AND THE ROLE OF 
THE STATE: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 17 (2001), available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan006225.pdf. 
 170. Id. at 2 (“the present form of globalization is largely shaped by the 
rules advanced by one part of the world – namely the most influential—and 
these rules do not necessarily favour developing countries and countries in 
transition.”). 
 171. See ELLIOTT, supra note 168, at 3 (“Labor ministry officials sometimes 
concede in private that foreign investors threaten to go elsewhere if they 
must deal with unions.”). 
 172. Jordan: QIZ Garment Factories: Jordanian-Israeli Business, 
WWEEK.COM (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.wweek.com/portland/article-18364-
jordan_qiz_garment_factories_jordanian_israeli_business.html. 
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Most textile manufacturing plants in Jordan’s QIZs are 
owned by Asian investors.173 However, these factories largely 
supply products to American MNCs. Therefore, their opera-
tions are inseparable from the American MNCs’ economic ven-
tures. The supply chain of MNCs is oftentimes highly complex, 
involving contractors, subcontractors, and perhaps even further 
subdivisions of labor in the subcontractor category. However, 
the overall cost structure of creating and selling a garment is 
set by the corporation, as are the factory codes of conduct. Ad-
dressing violations from the top down will inevitably result in 
greater scrutiny and enforcement of these codes of conduct, and 
lead to reduced human rights violations against women. 
Though MNCs may not affirmatively assist or cause a lower-
level employee to commit human rights violations, the MNC 
may passively allow the violation to occur in order to benefit 
from the coercive work conditions that result. If the company 
has not actually aided and abetted a state government in com-
mitting the abuses, it will not be held responsible under princi-
ples of international law, and victims will not be able to pursue 
charges against the company.174 While it cannot be said that 
the corporations operating in Jordan have explicitly demanded 
that state authorities maintain this status quo, the Jordanian 
government is effectively accommodating and protecting 
MNCs’ commercial interests in its failure to provide legal rem-
edies for women suffering from sexual abuse in the workplace. 
In addition, compared to female migrant workers, the MNCs 
have far more leverage over Jordanian law-making through the 
threat to remove capital from Jordan’s economy if labor costs 
increase. However, even if there is no legal claim against cor-
porations who do not act under the color of international law, 
there is still the notion that corporations are morally complicit 
for benefitting from human rights violations.175 Amnesty Inter-
national commented that, “to accept the benefits of measures 
by governments or local authorities to improve the business 
                                                                                                                                     
 173. See supra note 11. 
 174. BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 71, at 132. 
 175. See id. “Beyond law, the idea that companies are morally complicit if 
they passively benefit from violations is gaining ground. The UN Global 
Compact (Principle 2) warns that ‘should a corporation benefit from violations 
by authorities . . . corporate complicity would be evident.’” Id. 
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climate which themselves constitute violations of human 
rights, makes a company party to those violations.”176 
Regardless of a victims’ ability to sue an MNC under interna-
tional law, the victim can still pursue a claim against Jordan 
for failing to exercise due diligence in protecting her from vio-
lence at private hands.177 The best way for Jordan to discharge 
its duty to protect women is to spread liability to MNCs 
through civil sanctions under domestic law.178 
A large part of what makes Jordan attractive to MNCs is the 
lower cost structure and relaxed legal requirements for work-
ers’ rights.179 As noted previously, MNCs by nature of their 
corporate outsourcing mechanisms are able to deflect liability 
for workplace abuses to the subcontractor factories where hu-
man rights violations actually occur.180 This structure reflects 
the low priority MNCs give to contracted workers and the 
standard of their working conditions.181 In the garment indus-
try, a sector historically and culturally defined as “women’s 
work,” this low priority has allowed for the sexual abuse of em-
ployees that occupy a particularly vulnerable position in Jor-
danian society. 
Individualized criminal liability for each factory manager or 
supervisor may be less complex to administer than civil liabil-
ity of business enterprises, but it fails to reach the underlying 
infrastructure that condones violence against women as a form 
of labor coercion and sex discrimination. In comparison, a sys-
tem of civil remedies for victims of sexual violence in factory 
settings that extends into the larger corporate infrastructure 
reaches these underlying structural concerns. Thus, Jordan 
                                                                                                                                     
 176. Id. 
 177. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 178. See Gobert, supra note 28. “When offenders are sentenced to prison, 
the government must bear the not inconsiderable expense of housing and 
feeding the offender, providing a secure facility, and employing the necessary 
personnel to maintain order and protect the public against escapes.” Id. In 
comparison, a fine against a business entity is relatively cost-free to adminis-
ter and additionally generates the capital to provide compensation to the in-
jured worker for the human rights offense. See id. 
 179. DENIS G. ARNOLD & LAURA P. HARTMAN, BEYOND SWEATSHOPS: POSITIVE 
DEVIANCY AND GLOBAL LABOR PRACTICES 26, available at 
http://www.positivedeviance.org/pdf/research/ArnoldHartmanPositiveDevianc
e%5B1%5D.pdf. 
 180. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
 181. See ARNOLD & HARTMAN, supra note 179, at 27. 
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should impose joint and several liability against MNCs for the 
violations of its subcontractors. The doctrine of joint employer 
liability has promoted corporate accountability for the working 
conditions of garment workers in the United States182 and is a 
useful doctrine to promote female workers’ rights and safety up 
and down the supply chain. 
MNCs are in the best position to positively impact working 
conditions in their QIZ supplier factories, and judicial action 
against the MNCs for failing to do so will spur much needed 
reform. 183  Jordan must therefore hold them accountable 
through monetary civil liability for failure to monitor and en-
force workplace safety standards and workers’ rights in suppli-
er factories. 
Financial penalties are necessary to incentivize MNCs to en-
force their codes of conduct in good faith to prevent human 
rights abuses against women in supplier factories. “Whereas 
                                                                                                                                     
 182. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003). In Zheng, 
the plaintiffs were all employed by a garment factory that sewed apparel as a 
subcontractor to various clothing manufacturers, including Liberty Apparel 
(“Liberty”). The workers brought an action for wage theft under both the Fair 
Labor Standards Act and state law against both the garment factory and Lib-
erty, claiming that most of their work had been performed for Liberty. Id. at 
63–64. The case proceeded against Liberty when the supplier factory was no 
longer a viable defendant. Id. at 64. Although Liberty had never directly em-
ployed the garment workers, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied its 
motion for summary judgment and remanded to decide whether Liberty had 
functional control of the garment workers. Id. at 69. The pertinent factors 
included: (1) whether the corporation’s premises and equipment were used for 
the plaintiffs’ work; (2) whether the contractor company had “a business that 
could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint employer to another;” (3) 
the extent to which plaintiffs performed a discrete line item job integral to 
the corporation’s process of production; (4) whether responsibility under the 
contracts “could pass from one subcontractor to another without material 
changes;” (5) the degree to which the Liberty Defendants or their agents su-
pervised plaintiffs’ work; and (6) whether plaintiffs worked exclusively or 
predominantly for the defendant corporation. Id. at 72. 
 183. See generally Larry Cata Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise 
of Efficient Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legis-
lature, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739 (2007). The Global Compact suggests that 
MNCs have the authority to “enact, within their sphere of influence, a set of 
core values in the areas of human rights, labour standards, the environment, 
and anti-corruption.” Id. at 1754–55. Since QIZ factories supplying to MNCs 
are contractually bound by MNC supplier standards, MNCs are better able to 
enforce those norms through inspection, audit, sanctions, and possible con-
tract termination for failure to comply. Id. at 1755. 
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the greatest threat to an individual may be the loss of liberty, 
the greatest threat to a company is the loss of profitability. Be-
cause such a loss strikes at the essential purpose of the compa-
ny, a fine holds the potential to be an effective deterrent.”184 
The negative publicity associated with a court decision or col-
orable claim against a corporation is likely to cause reputation-
al harm that most corporations will try to avoid in the interest 
of protecting their public image and maintaining their stock 
prices.185 Judicial action and state sanctions against the corpo-
ration would spur the adoption of new corporate policies and 
enforcement practices for supplier plants that are designed to 
prevent future human rights violations. 186  Thus, reforms in 
MNC internal monitoring and enforcement practices will not 
only help to reduce violence against female workers, but will 
also help to reduce the concern on the part of MNC sharehold-
ers that their investments will suffer losses, either through ac-
tual legal liability, or through negative media attention. 
While imposing sexual harassment penalties may at first de-
ter MNCs due to the increased liability costs for operating fac-
tories in the QIZ, the law will lead to overall healthy business 
practices and long-term profitability. Safe and just work envi-
ronments enhance satisfaction and productivity of workers. 
They also lead to greater customer satisfaction and loyalty, and 
improved corporate character, thus promoting financial stabil-
ity in the long-term. Good corporate reputation may also create 
lower production costs over time, as supplier plants will prefer 
to work with such businesses. In addition, safe and healthy 
work environments “enhance the preference satisfaction of em-
ployees and shareholders who do not wish to benefit from work-
ing conditions and wages that they regard as unjustly exploita-
tive . . . [and] of consumers who do not wish to benefit from 
working conditions and wages that they regard as ethically 
wrong.” 187  Increased productivity and employee loyalty may 
ultimately offset the cost of the implementing mechanisms that 
provide greater protection to female QIZ workers’ basic rights 
under the CEDAW. 
                                                                                                                                     
 184. Gobert, supra note 28. 
 185. See ANCA IULIA POP, CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS—
COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 38 (2006). 
 186. See id. 
 187. See ARNOLD & HARTMAN, supra note 179, at 32. 
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CONCLUSION 
Sexual abuse and harassment in the workplace are critical 
problems in Jordan’s QIZ. The prevalence of abuse against mi-
grant women in factory settings points to persistent and sys-
temic discrimination against women in society. The discrimina-
tion encountered by women in the QIZ is multiplied after con-
sidering the intersectionality of their vulnerabilities. The Jor-
danian government must bear this in mind if it truly seeks 
gender equality in the workplace, as the CEDAW requires. By 
instituting laws against sexual harassment, making marginal-
ized women in the QIZ aware of their rights, and giving such 
women a cause of action in a court of law, Jordan can uplift 
both the status of women and encourage fair labor practices 
that are likely to increase the profitability of MNCs operating 
in the region. A cause of action must exist both criminally 
against individual offenders, as well as civilly against higher 
corporate bodies. The latter will ensure that a commitment to 
human rights in the workplace trickles down to supplier plants 
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